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Abstract—This paper makes a contribution to the 
development of computational archival science by thinking about 
and linking computational and archival thinking. It suggests that 
archival thinking and the archival problem space encompasses 
questions about the nature of consciousness, highlighting how 
these questions seem to be apparent within the fundamental 
archival principles of respect des fonds, provenance and original 
order. It seeks to shift attention back to provenance, not just in 
the sense of where a given object has come from, but also in the 
sense of the grounds on which it becomes an object and it 
suggests that the application of computational methods and tools 
for archival purposes and the integration of computational with 
archival thinking may offer a way to maintain awareness of this 
more philosophical dimension in practice. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
More than twenty years ago, Terry Cook wrote that ‘We 
[the archives and records management profession] have paper 
minds trying to cope with electronic realities’ [1]. Since then, 
massive strides have been taken in applying computational 
methods and tools within the archival problem space. For 
example, much archival data is encoded and processed in the 
form of XML, large web archives are automatically harvested, 
and search is an increasingly sophisticated tool supporting 
access to collections. Does this mean though that the minds of 
the archives and records management profession are any less 
‘paper’ than they were in 1994?  
Also back in 1994, the American Archivist contained an 
article by Ronald Weissman, who had been asked to predict the 
technology trends of the next thirty years [2]. He placed 
particular emphasis on a distinction between information 
processing and data processing, defined thus; ‘Information 
processing seeks to impute meaning to data, to uncover 
patterns and to wrestle creatively with ambiguity. By contrast, 
data processing deals with a few regular types of data and seeks 
to organize these data in regular and predictable ways via 
standard report generators’ [2]. 
He went on to point out that; ‘Our models of information 
processing have not changed fundamentally since the mid-
1970s. [….] the reason so little has changed […] is that our 
models of computing have been attuned to the easier problems 
of data management and our technology has lacked the 
requisite power to deal with the more difficult and more 
interesting problems of information processing’ [2]. 
Today our technology most definitely has ‘the requisite 
power to deal with the more difficult and interesting problems 
of information processing’ [2], but the ways in which that 
information processing is carried out are not necessarily 
analogous to the information processing, or thinking, that goes 
on in the human mind, as witnessed by ongoing consideration 
of the question of artificial intelligence.  
For example, a recent big issue raised by the Human 
Computer Interaction community, concerns the notion of the 
file [3]. File is a term with which archivists are very familiar 
and its direct transfer from a paper to a digital environment can 
perhaps be seen as indicative of ‘paper minds trying to cope 
with electronic realities’ [1]. Those raising the issue in 2013 
pointed out that they were not the first to do so. As far back as 
1981 Frank Halasz and Thomas Moran argued, in a paper 
entitled ‘Analogy Considered Harmful’ that, although 
analogies such as comparing a computer file system to an 
office filing cabinet might be thought to help individuals 
‘reason about the workings of the mysterious new computer 
system’, they might rather do more harm than good, preventing 
these individuals from ‘developing an effective understanding 
of systems’ [4]. For, as they went on to point out, ‘Computer 
systems are unique. The tasks they carry out may often be 
familiar, but their underlying conceptual structures are not’ [4]. 
Whilst this was not exactly the point that Terry Cook 
sought to highlight with his idea of ‘paper minds’, it is 
highlighted here [1]. For, it is suggested that archival thinking 
and the archival problem space encompasses questions about 
the nature of consciousness and the workings of the system and 
that the application of computational methods and tools for 
archival purposes and the integration of computational with 
archival thinking may offer a way to maintain awareness of this 
more philosophical dimension in practice. 
II. PHILOSOPHY ON CONSCIOUSNESS 
Philosophy’s investigation of consciousness is of long 
standing and can be broken down into many different lines of 
enquiry. One strand within this complex knot circles around the 
idea of the ‘explanatory gap’ defined broadly as ‘our 
incomplete understanding of how consciousness might depend 
upon a nonconscious substrate, especially a physical substrate’ 
[5]. There is ongoing disagreement however as to whether it 
will ever be possible to bridge the gap and what the 
metaphysical implications of it might or might not be. The 
explanatory gap therefore feeds into and out of two other 
philosophical discourses; that around the mind-body problem 
with the contrary positions of dualism and physicalism, and 
that of the hard problem of consciousness, of accounting in 
physical terms for qualia, ‘the subjective or qualitative 
properties of experiences’ [6].  
On the face of it, the field of archives and records 
management would appear to have very little to say about the 
above concerns, but appearances can be deceptive. In the next 
sections it will be suggested that archival thinking does relate 
to consciousness in its concern with both the fonds as an 
organic whole and the record. Also that it maintains its own 
version of the explanatory gap between the principles of 
respect des fonds and original order.  
III. ARCHIVES AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT ON CONSCIOUSNESS 
Although the fonds has a long history within archives and 
records management, it arguably only started to be seen in 
conceptual terms towards the end of the twentieth century. 
Shortly after its elevation of status to concept was made official 
however, particularly by the work of Terry Cook in the early 
1990s [7], it started to fall out of fashion; in 2002 Laura Millar 
announced its ‘death’ [8] and Peter Horsman spoke of its ‘de-
discovery’ [9]. In both cases the equally old but new usurper of 
fonds’ crown in the conceptual fundament was provenance, of 
which more later. The preference for provenance could 
arguably be explained by the fact that it was less tainted by 
direct association with an imperfect practice. For, the term 
fonds also equated with the main groups into which archival 
material was divided to facilitate its management. These 
groups were supposed to consist of ‘the whole of the records, 
regardless of form or medium, organically created and/or 
accumulated and used by a particular person, family, or 
corporate body in the course of that creator’s activities and 
functions’ [10], but working out what belonged to one fonds as 
opposed to another had not always been easy, and it was well 
recognised that the material of a single creator could be split 
between many different institutions and hence be in parts not a 
whole. 
More recently though, some archival theorists have started 
to re-assert and re-examine the fonds in conceptual terms. 
Geoffrey Yeo, for example, has sought to re-affirm Cook’s 
statement that the fonds should be seen as an intellectual 
construct and not a physical entity [11]. This he does in the 
context of problematizing the distinction often suggested 
between groups of materials labelled fonds and those labelled 
collections, in terms of fonds being organically accumulated 
and collections being artificially accumulated aggregations. 
Although he argues that the ‘organic/artificial distinction fails’ 
he does not directly address a seemingly related distinction 
which surfaces, for example in statements such as the 
following; 
 ‘any aggregation that results from conscious human action 
is an artificial creation’ 
 ‘In this tradition [the archival tradition that sees the fonds 
as ‘an organic growth’], organizations and individuals 
seem to exercise little or no conscious judgement in 
assembling a fonds’ [11] 
In this way there is a subtext around a distinction in levels 
of consciousness. For Yeo argues that no physical aggregation 
of records (at least above the level of the item) can be seen to 
be anything other than ‘based on fallible human judgement’; a 
selective aggregation or collection which has involved 
conscious decisions [11]. 
As a concept (and not necessarily a physical aggregation) 
however, Yeo still seems unwilling to give up the idea of the 
fonds as archival thinking’s ‘pre-eminent intellectual construct’ 
[11]. He also links his concept of the fonds, to another 
important concept within archival thinking, that of the record. 
Yeo views a record as ‘a kind of representation’ and sees the 
fonds as having ‘the potential to be just such a record’ in the 
sense that ‘it represents the work of an organization or the life 
of a person or a group of persons’ [11]. Distinctions in levels of 
consciousness are also apparent in Yeo’s work on the concept 
of the record, framed in particular by discussion of ‘the 
intention of the creator’ [12]. For example, he points to a 
divergence of opinion with regards to the ‘prevailing mental 
prototype of a record’, one of which places emphasis on 
‘conscious and procedurally separate construction’ and the 
other on the recordness of records being tied up with a process 
in which the ‘creators have little or no consciousness of 
recordkeeping purposes’ [12].  
From these examples, it is suggested that the concept of 
consciousness is not without some relevance to the archival 
problem space. Indeed, if we were to take one definition of 
consciousness as ‘a sense of one’s personal or collective 
identity’ [13] would it be such a stretch to suggest that the 
fonds is conceptually such a sense, and that when archivists 
talk of it representing ‘the work of an organization or the life of 
a person or a group of persons’ [11] this might be what they 
mean? Exploring the implications of equating fonds with 
consciousness is another project entirely, but for those 
interested in doing so, it is suggested that the concept might 
best be approached via the associated concepts of (in 
philosophical terms) intentionality and transparency, since 
these also have resonance in archival science.  
IV. ARCHIVES AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT ON THE 
EXPLANATORY GAP 
As has been mentioned above, another archival concept 
associated with, and sometimes elevated above, that of fonds, 
is that of provenance. Hence, a relatively common view 
amongst archival thinkers is to consider that the principle of 
provenance is; ‘the only principle of archival theory. This 
principle may have an outward application, which is to 
represent the archival body as it was created by an individual, a 
group or an organization as a whole. We call this Respect des 
fonds. The Principle of provenance may also be applied 
inwardly, respecting the original order given to the documents 
by the administration which created them. My thesis in this 
paper is, that both parts of the Principle of provenance form an 
inseparable whole’ [14]. 
Such conceptual unity does not always prove easy to 
implement however, and arguments, stemming from practice, 
have often highlighted the conflict that sometimes arises when 
seeking to follow both the principle of respect des fonds and 
that of original order. One solution to this problem, 
implemented in Australia in the 1960s, was to cease to 
physically implement fonds groups of records [15]. In so doing 
however, the fonds concept also fell slightly to the wayside, as 
the emphasis was placed more on provenance, and on a 
concept with which provenance thereafter became more 
associated, that of context. The Australian implementation was 
known as ‘the series system’ and it made a distinction between 
record control and context control [15].  
To be sure, the series system did resolve the conflict 
between the two sub-parts of the overarching principle of 
provenance in practice, but it is less clear that it did so 
conceptually, since the conflict between inward and outward 
applications or, as Cook put it, its internal and external 
dimensions [7], was to some extent by-passed in the shift of 
focus onto the level above and provenance. One recent attempt 
to look at the conflict anew has come from Jenny Bunn, who 
has seen in this tension, a means of accounting for the 
difficulty, identified by the scholars Maturana and Varela, in 
understanding ‘the regularity of the world we are experiencing 
at every moment, but without any point of reference 
independent of ourselves that would give certainty to our 
descriptions and cognitive assertions’ [16], [17]. In this reading 
therefore, the tension is not resolved in the sense of by-passed, 
but resolved in the sense of being explained as the maintenance 
of an awareness of an explanatory gap similar to that 
highlighted by philosophers in respect of consciousness. How 
is it that our sense of ourselves and the world around us – our 
consciousness – is dependent on some physical, external, or 
‘real’ substance or substrate?  
V. SO WHAT? 
In the preceding sections, the author has sought to explain 
why she thinks that questions about the nature of consciousness 
are encompassed by archival thinking and the archival problem 
space. More work will definitely be required to see if engaging 
with consciousness in philosophical terms will engender any 
insights that will facilitate archival practice, but such work lies 
outside the scope of this article. Rather, the next task this 
article has set itself is to examine the idea that the application 
of computational methods and tools for archival purposes and 
the integration of computational with archival thinking may 
offer a way to maintain awareness of this more philosophical 
dimension in practice. 
VI. THE QUESTION OF PERSPECTIVE 
As stated above, there was a shift in focus when archivists 
started to implement the series system, emphasizing 
provenance. This shift meant that the distinction and seeming 
conflict between provenance’s subparts, the internal and 
external dimensions of respect des fonds and original order, 
was lost to view to some extent. In many ways this was a 
useful development. It opened up a field of discourse led by 
theorists such as Chris Hurley, which started to critically 
examine provenance in relation to the purpose of archivists’ 
descriptive practices. Such consideration highlighted issues of 
perspective, of the need for description to be ‘grounded in a 
point of view (an ambience)’, but it also led it to a place where 
provenance was not just multiple, but simultaneously multiple, 
nay parallel [18]. Losing sight of the explanatory gap (the 
tension between respect des fonds and original order), failing to 
mind it in practice, had perhaps removed some of the grounds 
in which that practice had previously been grounded (albeit 
imperfectly). Those grounds being an awareness of the fact that 
archival provenance has meaning, not just in the sense of 
where a given object has come from, but also in the (more 
philosophical) sense of the grounds on which it becomes (seen 
as) an object. 
Provenance has recently become of interest within the 
computer science community as well with the development of 
the W3C PROV standard [19]. At a recent discussion on the 
W3C standard by archivists, it was suggested that the standard 
could ‘act as a tool to build common understanding of 
provenance between the profession and IT professionals’ but it 
was also observed by one individual on reading the standard 
‘that provenance was not as complex as I thought it was’ [20]. 
Taking these together, another interpretation might be though, 
that the standard does not demonstrate a ‘common 
understanding of provenance’ and that the complexity of what 
archivists’ mean by provenance, its philosophical dimension is 
not actually fully accounted for by it. The standard states that; 
‘PROV is a specification to express provenance records, which 
contain descriptions of the entities and activities involved in 
producing and delivering or otherwise influencing a given 
object’ [21]. 
Certainly archivists are interested in such things, 
particularly with regards to the many physical objects they 
have been given or loaned or bought, but, as McKemmish 
points out, they are also interested in objects which are not ‘a 
given’, but rather are ‘always in a state of becoming’ [22]. 
The suggestion being made here then, is that current 
specifications of provenance employed/applied within 
computer science, such as W3C PROV, do not quite capture 
the complexity of archival provenance, but that perhaps the 
same is also true of the current specifications of provenance 
employed/applied within archival science, such as, for example 
the new conceptual model, Records in Contexts, currently (in 
late 2016) available in draft form for consultation [23].  
VII. INTEGRATING COMPUTATIONAL WITH ARCHIVAL THINKING 
Already in this article, we have discussed much archival 
thinking, but we have not considered how archivists think. 
Little research has been done into the cognitive processes of 
archivists (as a specific subset), but one notable exception to 
this rule is a study, conducted by Victoria Lemieux which 
sought to infer a ‘model of the archivists’ analytic process 
during arrangement and description’, during that is the process 
in which, in this case, the archivists were seeking to implement 
the principles and concepts (of fonds, provenance, respect des 
fonds, original order) discussed above [24].  
The study’s findings suggested ‘a three-stage sense-making 
model’ in which each phase started sequentially, but then 
continued alongside the previous phases until the end of the 
process. The phases were characterized as: 
 Phase 1: From first contact with the records/general 
overview to the structure of fonds (draft of arrangement 
decision) 
 Phase 2: Confirm/refine structure and physical reordering 
 Phase 3: Description and finding aid [24] 
There is not as much detail as to the ‘thinking’ archivists 
are doing as we would like for the present purpose, but the 
study does characterize a reliance on abductive reasoning and 
sees the process in terms of sense making [24].  
This characterization would seem to contrast with the 
following definition of computational thinking, which has been 
developed by Jeannette Wing and others; ‘the thought 
processes involved in formulating problems and their solutions 
so that the solutions are represented in a form that can be 
effectively carried out by an information-processing agent’ 
[25].  
Wing has suggested that such thinking should be ‘part of 
the skill set of not only other scientists but of everyone else’ 
[26]. Learning such a skill set is now a part of Key Stage 3 
Computer Science in the United Kingdom, and a popular 
revision site describes it as having four cornerstones; 
decomposition, pattern recognition, abstraction and algorithms 
[27].   
Neither of the above examples give much insight into how 
thinking happens in a cognitive sense, but they do show how 
the two communities (archivists and computer scientists) think 
about their thinking, highlighting differences in what they think 
they are doing and how they characterize that doing. Further 
exploration and understanding of these differences would 
hopefully lead to better communication between the two 
communities, but for now the task at hand is to demonstrate 
how the application of computational methods and tools for 
archival purposes and the integration of computational with 
archival thinking may offer a way to maintain awareness of the 
more philosophical dimension of provenance in practice. 
VIII.  ARCHIVAL REPRESENTATION 
With regards to the archival process of arrangement and 
description, the object of Lemieux’s study above, a more 
common characterization is that of representation. One of the 
main proponents of this characterization is Elizabeth Yakel, 
who wrote an article on that subject in 2003 [28]. And more 
recently, Geoffrey Yeo has also utilised the idea of 
representation in his conceptualisation of a record as a 
‘persistent representation of activities, created by participants 
or observers of those activities or by their authorized proxies’ 
[29]. Above, we have seen how he has also suggested that the 
fonds might also be seen in a similar way in that ‘it represents 
the work of an organization or the life of a person or a group of 
persons’ [11].  
Before using the idea of representation, which he defines in 
general terms by saying that; ‘Representations are “things that 
stand for something else,” and are usually assumed to have 
some kind of correspondence to the thing they represent’ [29], 
Yeo provides a detailed exploration of the concept, pointing 
out that it is an issue for many disciplines. For example, he 
mentions how; ‘Psychologists are concerned with mental 
representations; broadly, systems that are assumed to represent 
aspects of the external world within the human head’ [29]. 
As we have seen above, there is in fact much to be said 
about the kind of correspondence there is between aspects of 
the external world and what goes on within the human head 
and one issue with representation is the extent to which what is 
being usually assumed in any seeming representational 
correspondence is or needs to be made explicit. 
Look, for example at the problems that archivists caused 
themselves by assuming that there was a correspondence 
between the fonds and a physical grouping of material. That 
assumption may now have been questioned and discarded, but 
what other potentially problematic assumptions are there that 
remain to be seen? In his own undermining of the assumption 
of the correspondence between fonds and physical 
aggregations, Yeo does suggest that the fonds might be ‘better 
understood as a conceptual abstraction’ but he does not explore 
the notion of abstraction in detail [11]. 
As we have seen, abstraction is one of the cornerstones of 
computational thinking and so perhaps thinking that archival 
thinking shares this cornerstone might help with any process of 
putative integration. Abstraction may be a troublesome concept 
for archivists because it is associated with information hiding 
and also a lack of attention to detail, neither of which fit 
terribly well with archivists’ view of their mission or their 
skillset.  One computer science textbook writes in these terms; 
‘Abstraction and information hiding are two sides of the same 
coin. Information hiding is the practice of hiding details; 
abstraction is the result with the details hidden’ [30]. 
But it also points out that ‘abstraction is the most powerful 
tool people have for managing complexity’ and archivists are 
increasingly coming to realise, particularly since the 
development of the continuum model, quite how much 
complexity they have been trying to manage in their work [30]. 
Abstraction does allow for filtering out of detail, but that detail 
is still there in a lower level of abstraction. Then again, 
abstraction does allow for interoperability and relation between 
its different layers or levels but it does not assume any kind of 
correspondence.  
One archivist who has explored abstraction in more detail 
however is Victoria Lemieux who speaks in her 2014 article of 
the ‘abstraction and representation of records and archives’ 
[31]. This article seeks to integrate ‘archival theory and 
practice with information systems theory and practice’ [31]. In 
so doing it characterizes the practice of provenance not in the 
sense of drawing up ‘descriptions of the entities and activities 
involved in producing and delivering or otherwise influencing 
a given object’, but in the sense of ‘building and representing a 
domain ontology’ [21], [31]. Here then the integration of 
computational with archival thinking, most specifically the 
consideration of abstraction, reflects back to the archival 
community that part of what they have always done, albeit 
perhaps unconsciously, is ontological in nature. Indeed, one of 
the main points emerging from this work was the development 
of ‘an ontological understanding of the record’ and the way in 
which this understanding required the ‘combined application of 
Bunge’s upper-level “substantive” ontology and Searle’s 
upper-level social ontology’ [31]. The message for the archival 
community is perhaps that the application of computational 
methods and tools (rather than their own traditional methods 
and tools) may suit archival purposes better as a way to 
maintain awareness of the more philosophical aspects of their 
work in practice. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I have sought to make a contribution to the 
development of computational archival science by thinking 
about and linking computational and archival thinking. I have 
suggested that questions about the nature of consciousness are 
apparent within some archival thinking around fonds, 
provenance and original order and that thus such questions are 
encompassed within archival thinking and the archival problem 
space. I have sought to shift attention back to these questions 
and to an idea of provenance, not just in the sense of where a 
given object has come from, but also in the sense of the 
grounds on which it becomes an object. Moving from an 
examination of how archivists traditionally characterize their 
thinking/activity when applying the idea of provenance, I have 
provided one example in which the integration of 
computational thinking (in consideration of abstraction) along 
with archival thinking (in consideration of representation) has 
shifted attention back to the more philosophical dimension of 
provenance. It is to be hoped that the narrative thereby 
constructed will facilitate the acceptance of computational 
archival science by the archival community and its increased 
understanding that the application of computational methods 
may suit their purposes better than traditional ones as a way to 
maintain awareness of the more philosophical aspects of their 
work in practice.  
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